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Editor's note: The following paper is an edited version of testimony presented before the Finance Committee of the United
States Senate on November 21, 1985.
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL POINTS
1. Interdependence reduces sovereign independence and frustrates national governments and leaders
in their attempts to carry out programs on behalf of
their constituents.

create situations which appear unfair and cause tensions and disputes. We need to think of some of these
situations as requiring an "interface" mechanism to
assist such nations to trade amicably together.
5. Subsidies are the most significant problem of
current trade policy. They are deeply intertwined with
national sovereignty. International rules on domestic
or general subsidies often involve balancing legitimate
national government policy goals with the "level playing field" policies. Consequently, a set of rules to help
accomplish this balancing is important. These rules
include an injury test and various principles of excluding from international consideration subsidy-like practices which either do not have an effect across borders,
or are de minimus. The specificity test would be
included.

"Interdependence" may be an overworked word, but
it accurately describes our world today. The United
States depends on exports and imports for an increasing percentage of its national economy, and many
other countries have a much higher dependence on
trade. Under these conditions, economic influences
flow with great rapidity from one country to the next.
Thus, despite all the talk about sovereignty, independence, and equality of nations, these concepts are fictions if used to describe today's real world. What is the
sovereignty of the government of a country whose
trade is so dependent on a neighbor that it cannot set
its own interest rate, specify its own tax system, or
design its own program of incentives for business or
talented individuals? As a result, there is much
frustration among governments and their leaders.
Most governments find it difficult to carry out such
program goals as providing full employment, or
increasing economic benefits on behalf of their
constituents.
2. To a large extent, the current conditions of interdependence result from the success of the Bretton
Woods System which includes the GATT.
3. "Unfair trade laws" are based on the policy of
the "level playing field" and market economic principles. Not all nations agree with these principles.
4. Major differences in economic systems, such as
between market and non-market economies, or developing and industrial countries, can create problems in
trading relationships. But even relatively minor differences between two similar countries, such as two
industrial market democracies, can by coincidence
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To a great extent, today's international economic
interdependence can be attributed to the success of the
institutions put in place just after World War II-what I
will loosely call the Bretton Woods System, which includes among others the IMF and the GATT. To be
sure, decreases in the costs of transportation and communication may have had the largest role, but without
the rules of the Bretton Woods System, governments
could easily have acted to negate many of those advantages. The efforts of the GATT over 38 years, for example, can be praised as the cause of the dismantling of
un-economic tariffs on trade in industrial goods, at
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least among the democratic market-oriented industrial
countries.
This success has caused us to face a new set of
problems.
With the decline of tariffs almost to irrelevancy, other
much more complex barriers or distortions to trade
appear to be relatively more important. Non-tariff barriers are myriad, and the ingenuity of man to invent
new ones assures us that the problem of trade barriers
will never go away. This is why one of the most important problems facing us is institutional - the question
of whether national and international governmental
institutions (such as GATT) have the capacity to meet
the challenges of private and governmental behavior
which could impose great risks on the interlinked trade
and investment world in which we find ourselves.
· You have asked me to address particularly the problem of what is "fair" or "unfair" in today's international
trade practices. As the focus has shifted from tariffs
responding to fair trade, or even from escape clauses
or so-called safeguard practices also responding to fair
trade, enterprises troubled by foreign competition
have increasingly turned to the unfair trade laws for
relief from that competition. In many, perhaps most,
cases it is appropriate that they do so. It must be recognized, however, that in some cases, attempts are being
made to respond to practices abroad which are unfair
only in the eyes of the domestic industries which
would like freedom from the challenges which competition brings. There is an increasing number of
situations which involve very difficult balancing of
contradictory economic, cultural, and political goals.

Non-tariff barriers are myriad, and the
ingenuity of man to invent new ones
assures us that the problem of trade barriers
will never go away.

The essential policy behind unfair trade practice
rules is the notion of the "level playing field." This is
the idea that enterprises should be able to compete in
the open markets of the world on the basis of market
economic principles which apply equally to all participating enterprises. Unfortunately, as we are well
aware, many societies do not have the affinity for market economics which we in the United States do. Thus,
at the very base of the idea, we are troubled by deep
and fundamental differences of opinion about the
appropriate economic role of governments.
I cannot comment about all of the many rules regarding "unfair trade." Instead I would like to use a hypothetical example to illustrate the conceptual problem of
applying some of them. Then I would like to comment
on what seems to be the most difficult current trade
policy subject - that of government subsidies and
the appropriate responses to such subsidies. I have
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brought with me several exhibits designed to help
me make certain points about these.
It is reasonably obvious that nations with very different economic systems are likely to have some difficulties in trading together. For the United States, with
its market economy, to trade extensively with a nonmarket country like the Soviet Union, presents a
number of problems. With good reason, enterprises
in the United States worry whether they are facing
competition which is essentially underwritten by the
government of the non-market economy. The international rules, such as those of GATT, were not well
designed to govern such situations.

The essential policy behind unfair trade
practice rules is the notion of the "level

playing field."
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Likewise, an industrial nation will face problems in
trading with a developing country. Low wage rates,
as well as many non-market features of the developing country's government, can impose considerable
adjustment strains on the industrial society. On the
other hand, the developing country worries about the
strains which high efficiency and high technology can
impose on it through imported goods.
What is often surprising, however, is that even nations with very similar economic systems, such as two
industrial country market economies, can find that
minor variations in their economic systems can create
situations which have the appearance of unfairness.
These situations may have arisen almost completely by
accident. That is, there may have been no intention to
engage in any practice which is deemed "unfair," or
which appears to shift burdens such as unemployment
or adjustment onto another society. Let me illustrate
this with Exhibit 1. In this exhibit, a situation is posed
which is based on trade between moderately different
economic systems. The fact that, in an industry in one
society, a higher portion of average costs are fixed
costs means that it has lower variable costs. In times
of slack demand, enterprises of that industry will
rationally seek to continue producing if they can sell at
any price which will be slightly above their variable
costs. Under conditions of liberal or free trade, such a
low variable cost society will very likely export extensively to a society with higher variable (i.e., lower
fixed) costs, thus causing adjustment and unemployment in the latter. This is so even though long term
average costs in both societies are the same. Is this
"unfair," or is it a coincidental (but real) problem which
the two societies should try to solve with a buffering
mechanism which minimizes administrative and advocacy costs as well as moral terminology?
In some of my writings I have termed this problem
the "interface" problem. This word draws on the termi-

nology of computer technology. When it is desired that
two computers of different makes work together, it
often takes some kind of "interface" mechanism or program to mediate between them and to translate the language of one machine to that of the other. Likewise,
when two societies with even minor economic differences desire to work together, frictions or misunderstandings can occur unless there is an interface
mechanism. To a certain extent, the national trade laws
and the GATT-Bretton Woods System are operating
today as a rather crude interface mechanism. The problem often is that policy leaders have not perceived this,

utility for world economic welfare and harmony.
It may be that, to a certain extent, the anti-dumping
rules and/or the subsidy rules are performing this
interface function, although with much administrative
cost and overtones of moral indignation that may not
always be appropriate. With respect to the anti-dumping laws, incidentally, it must be recognized that they
are based on policies very analogous to our domestic
price-discrimination laws, and that there have been
important criticisms of those policies. Many economists suggest that price discrimination by an enterprise
is not only not unfair, but can have a pro-competitive
effect which strengthens an economy.

Exhibit No. 1

. . . it is clearly very important to draw some
border lines around the concept of "subsidy"
for trade policy purposes.

VARIABLE COSTS AND THE INTERFACE PRINCIPLE
Assume the following facts: In the same industrial sector (e.g. steel)
in two societies (e.g. Japan and the United States) the following different characteristics are present: (No assertion is made that these
facts are real. This is an hypothetical case to illustrate a principle.)
Society A: Worker tenure (no layoffs, etc.) High debt-equity ratio in
capitalization (e.g. 90% debt)
Society B: No worker tenure (worker costs thus are "variable costs")
Debt-equity ratio not exceeding 50% (dividends can be
skipped)
Examine the implications for variable cost analysis in times of slack
demand:
Economists note that in times of slack demand, a firm is rational to
continue producing as long as it can sell at or above its short term
variable costs (because it must continue paying its fixed costs anyway). Of course this can only continue for limited periods, persumably over the complete business cycle the firm must not incurr losses.
Analysis of short term variable costs in Societies A and B:
Assume: (million$ unless per unit)
Society A
Costs of a firm:(Average prod)
Plant upkeep etc.
Debt Service:
Dividends (cost of capital)
Worker costs (ave workforce)
Cost of materials (ave)
TOTAL COSTS:
Fixed:
Variable:
Variable costs per unit
if ave output 1 mil. units
(i.e. price needed to produce)

Society B

20 fixed
90 fixed
10 var
40 fixed
40 var

20 fixed
50 fixed
50 var
40 var
40 var

200
150
50

200
70

50

130

130

RESULT if imports from A to B: Plant in B closes. (Is A "unfair''?)

but instead believe that it is necessary to characterize
some practices as "unfair" or "illegal." In at least some
of the international trade problems which exist today, a
more neutral terminology and policy approach that
would avoid moral overtones may operate with greater

I believe that the most important trade policy problem today is that of subsidies for goods which move
across borders. This includes not only the pure export
subsidy, but also general or domestic subsidies benefiting all goods of a particular type which are produced
in a society, whether or not they are exported.
Sometimes it is suggested that imports of subsidized
goods ought not to be a subject of concern. Inde~d, the
consumer or buyer in the importing country clearly
benefits from the subsidy. Thus it is said that such
country should send the export country a "thank-you
note."
I do not join this viewpoint. First, it does not adequately take into account the broader world perspective by which economists demonstrate that subsidies
have a distorting effect on market economic principles.
Such effect tends to reduce world welfare.
Second, subsidies could in some cases have a predatory intent. They could be used to assist an industry to
gain foreign market share, with a view that after driving out foreign competitors, prices could be raised to
capture so-called monopoly "rents." Even if this is not
the case, there still is the legitimate worry that when
the subsidy begins, it can cause adjustment costs in the
importing country. When it ends it can again cause
such costs, and these costs can be substantial, possibly
even rivaling the benefit to the importing society from
the subsidy itself.
Third, and more subtle, subsidies on imported
goods can have an effect on the efficiency and initiative of a market economy, by adding to the risks of
innovation, small business start-ups, and general
entrepreneurial activity. The businessman sometimes
says that he can compete against fair trade, on a level
playing field, but he cannot compete against the deep
pockets of a foreign finance ministry with government
taxation at its disposal. Even if these fears are exaggerated, a subsidy offered by a foreign government may
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be designed to shift political burdens to foreign countries, as the exporting society struggles to maintain a
majority in its parliament by propping up sick industries in key constituencies. One approach is for the importing country to "counter subsidize," but in doing
so it may be simply altering its own economic system.
Why should an exporting nation be allowed to impose
such changes on an importing nation?
All of these arguments have led statesmen for a century to recognize that international rules are needed to
limit the uses of subsidies in international trade, and
importing nations should be allowed a unilateral permitted response of a countervailing duty to offset the
subsidy effect of imports. The really tough question,
however, is how far to take this principle.
If the word "subsidy" for these purposes is used in a
broad sense, such as the way some economists use it to
indicate any economic benefit furnished by a government, the result becomes absurd. Even good fire and
police protection is a subsidy in this sense, since it
reduces the insurance cost of producing goods. Roads
and schools likewise can be called subsidies. Soon
importing societies could be countervailing right and
left, with grave implications for the policies of liberal
trade.
Consequently, it is clearly very important to draw
some border lines around the concept of "subsidy" for
trade policy purposes. I prefer to think in terms of a
sub-set of activities within the universe of broadly defined subsidy, which I would term "actionable subsidies." These "actionable subsidies" are the only
subsidizing activities to which the international and

The United States has become far and away
the largest user of countervailing duty
procedures.

national trade rules should respond. The critical question then becomes defining a set of rules that can identify which subsidies should be considered
"actionable."
This is not always an easy task, however. In the case
of export subsidies it may be relatively easy. Usually
such activity has an apparent motive of shifting certain kinds of political or adjustment burdens to other
nations and arguably should be prohibited or at least
countervailed, possibly as a "per se" violation of the
rules without benefit of an injury test.
Domestic or general subsidies are another matter,
however. Such subsidies are an important tool of government policy. They are used extensively by all governments, and often for laudatory policy goals, such as
redressing unfair imbalances of income, alleviating distress of poverty, or pursuing democratic priorities of
various types such as cultural, religious, national
30

security goals. They are mixed deeply into the fabric
of national sovereignty. In these cases, the objectives
of international trade rules to minimize market distortions must be balanced against the competing legitimate government goals.

Recognition must be given to the reciprocity
and fairness of symmetry of subsidy rules:
whatever rules the United States follows it
must recognize the right of other countries to
also follow. ..
One way this is done is to provide an "injury test" as
a prerequisite for unilateral countervailing duties of an
importing nation. As long as the subsidies on the imports do not in fact cause a sufficient threshold injury
to the competing industry of the importing country,
no countervailing duty response should be permitted.
This is essentially the structure of the international and
national rules on the subject. However, the importance
of the injury test as a mediating or "interface" mechanism between two opposing and equally legitimate
policy objectives is sometimes forgotten.
In the testimony I presented before the Sentate
Finance Committee, I set forth a large number of specific subsidy-like practices.* Some of these practices
should clearly be designated as "actionable subsidies."
Others should clearly not be so designated, because
they are common activities of governments, and
because they have so little distorting effect. Still other
practices on the list illustrate how deeply entwined
into the fabric of society are certain activities which
could be called subsidies. In an inappropriately broad
sense of subsidy, even bankruptcy or social security
could be swept into the category of "subsidy."
The United States has become far and away the
largest user of countervailing duty procedures. All
other nations combined have probably not used countervailing duties explicitly to offset subsidies on imports more than about two dozen times. Yet since the
1974 Trade Act, the United States has had about 250
petitions for countervailing duties, and found affirmatively so as to apply such duties in approximately 30
cases. As I mentioned above, there are good policy reasons for this approach. But the United States is blazing
a trail. Its administrators have had to face tough questions well in advance of international agreement on
many subsidy issues. Because of it's economic importance, its actions have an asymmetrically weighty
impact on the trade of our partners.
Countervailing duties applied by many small nations
would have essentially no impact. Such duties by the
United States can have serious impacts on foreign
national policies, economic welfare, debt service
capability, and political stability. These imports impose
on the United States important responsibilities, which
some of our trading partners are not certain we are

prepared to fulfill. We need to proceed fairly, and in a
principled manner. We need to avoid the processes
themselves becoming burdensome out of proportion to
their benefits. We need to be prepared to discuss and
enter into international agreements on many of the
subsidy issues, and to submit as well as demand others
submit to objective dispute settlement procedures concerning these issues. We need to be able to implement
into our own legal system the results of these agreements and dispute settlement determinations (a question on which there is some doubt).

Because of the economic importance of the
United States, its actions have an asymmetrically weighty impact on the trade of

our partners.

-

In conclusion, let me suggest a few principles which
might form part of a larger set of rules designed to help
define the border lines of "actionable subsidy" in a way
which appropriately balances the various conflicting
policy goals of giving maximum possible freedom to
national sovereigns to pursue goals of their constituents, while preventing international trade activity that
tends to shift the burden of those national programs
onto other countries. I would suggest:
1) Recognition must be given to the reciprocity and
fairness of symmetry of subsidy rules: whatever rules
the United States follows it must recognize the right of
other countries to also follow and that therefore such
rules may affect United States exports as well as
imports.
2) Response to subsidies should only occur when it
can be shown by economic analysis that a particular
subsidy practice can have an effect across a border. If a
particular nation wishes to distort its own economy,
or reduce its own welfare by subsidizing some group,
that should be considered a national decision not of
concern to the international trade system, unless some
reasonably significant effect on other countries can be
shown. In some cases, for example, regional aides
would fall in this category when they only shift the
location of an industry but do not affect amounts or
prices of goods exported. Likewise, some natural
resource policies may be shown to cause no changes
in export amounts or prices, but instead merely to
redistribute economic "rents" within the exporting
country.
3) Some practices, such as most export subsidies,
should probably be defined by international agreement
to be "per se" violations of fairness rules, so that a rapid
response could be implemented even without an
injury test.
4) A de minimus termination at an early stage of
cases is important to minimize procedural and administrative costs and to minimize unnecessary intrusion

into the internal affairs of other countries. The current
United States de minimus level of 0.5 percent is probably too low. A higher de minimus could be the prima
facie case, with opportunity for petitioners in certain
specific circumstances of low margin goods to show
that a lower de minimus is necessary.
5) The injury test is an important mediating "interface" mechanism, and should not be weakened by
devices such as cumulation, or departure from a
"margins" causal analysis.
6) The "specificity" (or general availability) test
can be a very useful principle to avoid using subsidy
response rules for many government practices which
are often common among all governments, and which
probably have little distorting effect. Roads, schools,
and fire and police protection all come to mind. This
test needs to be refined and rethought to avoid its inappropriate use, however.
7) More effort is needed to reduce the costs of
procedure and administration, so that these do not
themselves become trade barriers. Some principles
mentioned above would help. ml

John H. Jackson, the Hessel E. Yntema Distinguished Professor of Law, has been on the Michigan faculty since 1966.
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